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A New Chinese Economic Law Order?  
 
By Gregory Shaffer and Henry Gao1 
 
 
China is incrementally developing a new, decentralized model of economic governance 
through a web of finance, trade, and investment initiatives involving memoranda of understanding, 
contracts, and trade and investment treaties. It combines private and public international law in 
transnational legal ordering imbued with Chinese characteristics. It builds from existing Western 
models, but it repurposes them. In this way, China could create a vast, Sino-centric, regional order 
in which the Chinese state plays a nodal role. This article explains how.  
The Chinese model for international economic law reflects a component of China’s internal 
development in the 2000s, which supplemented economic reform and liberalization with state-led 
infrastructure development. The model starts with the financing of infrastructure through Chinese 
state-owned banks as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, involving telecommunications 
networks, roads, airports, and ports, which Chinese companies build using Chinese standards. 
These projects enable China to export its excess capacity of steel, concrete, and other products. 
They also open new markets for Chinese products generally. They are supported by private law 
contract and dispute resolution. This comprises the key private international law component of 
China’s economic law model. China then complements these initiatives with bilateral investment 
and free trade agreements that assure preferential access for Chinese goods, services, and capital. 
This web of agreements comprises the public international law supportive component of its model. 
In parallel, China massively subsidizes technological innovation to reduce reliance on Western 
technology, while encouraging Chinese state-owned and private companies to acquire advanced 
technology abroad, luring Chinese scientists who study abroad to return to China, and enhancing 
the role of intellectual property within China. This component involves Chinese domestic law, but 
its aim and effect are transnational in scope. Here too China builds from and repurposes Western 
legal models.  
China implements these initiatives gradually and pragmatically to learn from trial and error, 
analogous to the country’s internal development model, reflected in the popular adage attributed 
to Deng Xiaoping — “crossing the river by feeling the stones.”2 But now, Chinese state-owned 
and private enterprises are internationalized and integrated within Sino-centric global production 
chains. It is a hub and spokes model, with China at the hub.3 These initiatives are reshaping the 
                                                 
1 Gregory Shaffer is Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law; Henry Gao is 
Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. 
2 Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 2. 
3 As noted by Alba, Hur, and Park, the hub and spokes model is a framework that has been used to analyze trade 
agreements since the 1970s. Joseph Alba, Jung Hur, and Donghyun Park, “Do Hub-and-Spoke Free Trade Agreements 
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ecology of the international trade legal order. Their development will depend on political and 
economic contests within China regarding policy formation and implementation and the response 
to these initiatives abroad, in each case involving competition among factions. Collectively, these 
internal, external, and international contests will shape the future of the transnational economic 
legal order. 
One of the central takeaways from this article is that the U.S.-launched trade war will not 
— contra Trump — “be easy to win.”4 China has developed close economic ties with countries 
around the world such that in 2017 it was the largest importer for twice as many countries as the 
United States (61 vs. 30) and the top exporter for 30 countries (compared to 38 for the United 
States).5 It has thus diversified its trade so that it is less subject to U.S. leverage, and other countries 
will have little interest in decoupling from China. While the United States may press a few 
countries not to use Huawei and other high-tech Chinese products on national security grounds, 
even they will be tempted to develop ways to do so if these companies’ products are superior or 
better bargains; otherwise, their economies will be prejudiced.  
In this article, we first lay theoretical ground for understanding China’s approach (Part A). 
We then examine China’s export of a state-led, infrastructure-based development model (using 
private international law tools) (Part B), complemented by its construction of a web of free trade 
and investment agreements (using public international law components) (Part C), together with an 
indigenous innovation policy (grounded in domestic law with a transnational aim) (Part D). We 
show how these distinct initiatives link to constitute a major development in the changing ecology 
of the transnational legal ordering of trade and economic relations (Part E). In a field in which 
scholars increasingly attend to the question of what to do about China, this article aims to assess 
these developments in a neutral manner since meaningful normative and policy analysis depends 
on clear analysis.  
 
A. Mimicking while Repurposing; The Evolving Ecology of the Economic Law Order 
China’s model is not completely new. It has its forbearers with those of former colonial 
empires that built ports, railroads, roads, and bridges around the world to extract natural resources 
and create new markets for their manufactured products. As in those earlier times, China will 
encounter local resistance, while working with local allies to create economic ties to advance its 
interests. Westerners made their fortunes in the process, as will many Chinese today.  
Similarly, neither does China offer a completely new model of finance, trade, and 
investment law norms and institutions since it borrows heavily from Western models. China’s 
                                                 
Increase Trade? A Panel Data Analysis,” ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, no. 46 (Apr. 
2010) (finding that “in addition to the direct trade liberalizing effect of FTAs, the hub-and-spokes nature of FTAs has 
an additional positive effect on trade”). 
4 Ana Swanson, “Trump Calls Trade Wars ‘Good’ and ‘Easy to Win,’” New York Times, March 2, 2018. 
5  Cent. Intelligence Agency, “Imports - Partners,” The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/403.html (last visited September 23, 2019); Cent. Intelligence Agency, “Exports - Partners,” 
The World Factbook. 
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model mimics and repurposes Western laws and institutions.6 China is developing new institutions 
and structures that build from and interact with existing ones, such as the WTO for trade, ICSID 
for investment arbitration, the World Bank for finance, the London Commercial Court for 
transnational contract disputes, and the WTO and World Intellectual Property Organization for 
intellectual property. China is mimicking these institutions with its own while repurposing them 
to advance its interests.  
Two complementary ways of viewing these changes are in terms of “layering” and 
“ecologies.” The concept of “layering” captures how new structures are built on previous ones as 
part of institutional change. 7  China’s initiatives layer on top of existing international trade, 
investment, and development finance institutions. The concept of “ecologies” captures how actors 
interact, coexist, cooperate, and compete in complex processes within and between institutions 
that shape institutional development over time.8 As Susan Block-Lieb and Terence Halliday write, 
“global lawmaking should not begin with an IO [international organization] as the unit of analysis, 
but with the sea in which it swims.”9 China’s initiatives dynamically form part of a complex 
ecology of international economic institutions that coexist, complement, cooperate, and compete 
to shape norms and normative ties. This article assesses Chinese legal developments to 
complement accounts that focus on geopolitics and economics and often ignore law or treat law as 
epiphenomenal. In practice, these three dimensions — economics, politics, and law — interact and 
intermesh to shape global outcomes, such that legal ordering is a critical (and often missing) part 
of policy analysis. 
Much of China’s model for economic law order is fragmentary. Its signature Belt and Road 
Initiative is an amalgam of multitudinous projects. Thus, what we are describing is not a neatly 
coherent, centralized order. Rather, we are presenting our construction of how the disparate parts 
combine in what can be viewed as a decentralized Sino-centric legal order. It is comprised of a 
web of agreements under the Belt and Road Initiative, supported by bilateral trade and investment 
agreements, in turn linked to China’s indigenous innovation policy to ensure the initiative is a 
high-end one where China is the node. 
                                                 
6 Compare Elkins et al., “The Content of Authoritarian Constitutions,” in Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, eds. 
Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 141 (on mimicking and 
repurposing constitutions) and Tom Ginsburg, “Authoritarian International Law” (draft on file). This is a different 
dynamic than that of “selective adaptation” scholars used earlier to address China’s internal law reforms. Pitman B. 
Potter, “Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective Adaptation of Globalized Norms and Practices,” 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 2: 119-150 (2003). 
7 Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States 
and Japan (2004), at 35 (“layering ... involves the grafting of new elements onto an otherwise stable institutional 
framework”); Jeroen van der Heijden, “Institutional Layering: A Review of the Use of the Concept,” Politics 31, no. 
9 (2011). 
8 Susan Block-Lieb and Terence Halliday, Global Lawmakers: International Organizations in the Crafting of World 
Markets (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) (on ecology theory; “global lawmaking should not begin 
with an IO as the unit of analysis, but with the sea in which it swims”); Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack, “Hard vs 
Soft Law; Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance,” Minnesota Law Review 94 
(2010): 706. 
9 Lieb and Halliday, Global Lawmakers, at 31. 
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Philip Jessup theorized the combination of private international law, public international 
law, and “other law” addressing transnational problems as “transnational law.”10 China’s model 
combines these tools pragmatically. Yet, when viewed in combination, China’s initiatives involve 
more than transnational problem solving through law. They aim to create order, a transnational 
economic law order, with China at the hub.11 
China is not aiming to create a rival model to the WTO and the Bretton Woods institutions. 
China supports the WTO and Bretton Woods institutions, which have served it well. Indeed, it is 
rather the United States which first moved to develop a web of ambitious free trade agreements 
after the failure of WTO negotiations at the Cancun ministerial meeting in 2003.12 It was the 
United States that then turned to megaregional agreements under the Obama administration 
through the proposed TransPacific Partnership (with Asia and Latin America) and Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (with Europe) designed to isolate China. Similarly, it is the U.S. 
Congress that blocked an increase in Chinese shareholder and voting rights in the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund to correspond to its importance in the global economy. And it is now 
the United States under the Trump administration which has ignored WTO rules in launching the 
trade war while neutering the WTO’s Appellate Body. Similarly, it is now the Trump 
administration that threatens to splinter the internet by pressing countries not to use 
telecommunications infrastructure made by Huawei, the world leader. 
Nonetheless, China’s model represents a different one than the liberal, multilateral, law-
centered model built by the United States and Europe after World War II and expanded and 
solidified after the Cold War. Unlike the U.S. and European models, China’s is based not on legal 
transplants from home used to construct regional and global rules and institutions, but rather on 
development policy grounded in infrastructure and innovation, supported by memoranda of 
understanding, contracts, and treaties. Moreover, China’s model, led by an authoritarian country, 
is less transparent and thus more attractive to authoritarian regimes. It is a hub and spokes model 
because the trade relations are essentially bilateral. Formal law and formal dispute settlement play 
reduced roles and are displaced by soft law (set forth in memoranda of understanding) and informal 
state-to-state and private negotiation to resolve disputes. They operate along a model of “relational 
contracts” under which the ongoing relationship is more important for the contracting parties than 
                                                 
10 Philip Jessup, Transnational Law (1956) (defining “transnational law” in functional terms as “all law which 
regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers,” which includes public international law, private 
international law, and “other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories”). 
11 Compare Jessup’s analysis with that of Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer on “transnational legal orders.” 
Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders (2015); and Gregory Shaffer and Carlos Coye, 
“From International Law to Jessup’s Transnational Law; from Transnational Law to Transnational Legal Orders,” in 
The Many Lives of Transnational Law: Critical Engagements with Jessup’s Bold Proposal (2020). As we will see, 
China’s model does not involve deep integration of norms unlike the Western liberal model, but nonetheless aims at 
a type of transnational order that penetrates states through creating close ties with government and private sector 
leaders. 
12 After Cancun, USTR Robert Zoellick wrote “As WTO members ponder the future, the US will not wait: we will 
move towards free trade with can-do countries.” Robert Zoellick, “America Will Not Wait for the Won’t-do Countries,” 
Financial Times, Sept. 22, 2003. 
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formal legal commitments.13 They do so in the shadow of China’s increased economic clout and 
thus of power asymmetries. As Tom Ginsburg writes, it is a legal order grounded more in 
“coordination” (of policy and commercial relations) rather than “commitment” (in terms of legal 
rights).14 If the United States indeed pursues a decoupling of its economy with China’s, then we 
need to understand what China’s model looks like, especially if the rest of the world is pressed to 
take sides in an economically contested Cold War. 
 
B. Exporting the Chinese Development Model Abroad: Financing Infrastructure  
 
In contrast to a neoliberal model of development through private enterprise and market 
competition, the Chinese model emphasizes the key role played by government planning and 
industrial policy, involving massive investment in infrastructure. As the Chinese economy grew 
increasingly strong, China gained confidence in its economic model and started to promote it as 
an alternative to development models advocated by U.S.-dominated Bretton Woods institutions 
that rely on private property, markets, and a non-interventionist state. Several Chinese initiatives 
illustrate China’s approach, especially the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and New Development Bank. Through them, China aims to develop new markets 
for Chinese products governed through a combination of contracts and treaties, backed by new 
dispute resolution mechanisms. They spur economic integration that creates new ties with Beijing, 
providing Beijing with greater leverage politically.15 In law and development circles, this model 
is often referenced as the “Beijing model” or “Beijing consensus,” constituting a rival to the so-
called neoliberal “Washington consensus,” as summarized in Table 7.116  
 
Table 7.1. Comparison of Washington Consensus and Beijing Consensus 
 Washington Consensus Beijing Consensus 




economy with little 
government intervention  
Industrial policy with heavy 
state intervention; state-
                                                 
13 Ian Macneil, The Relational Theory of Contract: Selected Works of Ian Macneil (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001); 
Stewart Macaulay, “Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,” American Sociological Review 28: 
55 (1963).  
14 Ginsburg, “Authoritarian International Law.” 
15 Nadege Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative 
(Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), 181 (giving examples of Mongolia, Norway, and South 
Korea. Relatedly, China’s domestic infrastructure building was not only “a tool to stimulate growth in times of 
financial and economic crises but also … a way to consolidate the central government’s control over the country’s 
remote frontiers.”) 
16 John Williamson, “Is the “Beijing Consensus” Now Dominant?,” Asia Policy (2012). These are archetypes and 
involve ideological contestation within countries, including within China, but Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and 
the U.S. frontal challenge to China threatening to divide the world into competing blocs have given them greater 
salience. Matt Ferchen, “Whose China Model is it Anyway? The Contentious Search for Consensus,” Review of 
International Political Economy 20, no. 2 (2013): 390-420. 
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owned firms for critical 
sectors  
Trade and investment 
policies 
Open economy with little 
restriction on foreign trade 
and investment 
Limited opening with many 
express or de facto 
restrictions on foreign trade 
and investment 
Foreign policy Promotion of liberal, 
democratic, market ideals 
Non-interference, sovereignty 
and self-determination  




through trial and error 
 
Source: The authors’ own compilation.17  
 
1. Belt and Road Initiative 
 
First proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
ambitiously aims to develop new markets, enhance the security of China’s access to resources, and 
facilitate the internationalization of the Renminbi, China’s currency, while building new 
institutions and governance mechanisms.18 It is predominantly a private international law model 
based on contract and contract dispute resolution. Formally, the BRI’s objectives are to build five 
types of links among countries lying along BRI industrial corridors: (1) To enhance “policy 
coordination”; (2) To improve infrastructure “connectivity”; (3) To reinforce “unimpeded trade; 
(4) To move forward with “financial integration”; and (5) To create “people-to people bonds.”19 
In this way, China can create a network of “strategic partnerships” grounded in economic ties that 
                                                 
17 This compilation builds from our own observations as well as the following works in the broader literature: Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, “Interview Transcript with John Williamson,” Beijing Consensus Versus 
Washington Consensus?, Nov. 2, 2010; Yasheng Huang, “Debating China’s Economic Growth: The Beijing 
Consensus or The Washington Consensus,” Academy of Management Perspectives 24, no. 2 (2010): 31–47; Yang 
Yao, “Beijing Consensus Or Washington Consensus: What Explains China's Economic Success?,” Development 
Outreach World Bank (2011); Keun Lee, Mansoo Jee and Jong-Hak Eun, “Assessing China's Economic Catch-Up at 
the Firm Level and Beyond: Washington Consensus, East Asian Consensus and the Beijing Model,” Industry and 
Innovation 18, no. 5 (2011): 487-507; Randall Peerenboom, “China and the Middle-Income Trap: Toward a Post 
Washington, Post Beijing Consensus,” The Pacific Review 27, no. 5 (2014): 651-673.  
18 Julian Chaisse and Mitsuo Matsushita, “China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative: Mapping the World Trade Normative 
and Strategic Implications,” Journal of World Trade 52, no. 1 (2018):163. It also enables China to diversify its 
investment of its foreign exchange reserves away from low-yield U.S. government bonds. Tom Miller, China’s Asian 
Dream: Empire Building Along the New Silk Road (London: Zed Books, 2017), 32. In the process, China aims to be 
a leader in the development of a central bank digital currency, while proceeding cautiously. Chen Jia, “China Promotes 
Global Digital Fiat Currency Standardization, China Daily (Dec. 8, 2018).” 
19 National Development and Reform Commission, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the 
People's Republic of China,” Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century 
Maritime Silk Road, State Council, 2015.  
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enhance regional and global economic integration, increase economic reliance on China, and 
further Chinese influence. 20  Some of these projects facilitate China’s projection of military 
strength, including by providing the Chinese navy with access to deep water ports. 21  More 
generally, China aims to project soft (and “smart”) power through such financing, which is not 
subject to the conditionalities imposed by the West.22 Many countries view its exercise of power 
as subtler than that of the United States, which difference became even more salient under the 
Trump administration.23 
The BRI comprises the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt, which links China with 
Europe through Central and Western Asia, and the sea-based 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, 
which connects China with Southeast Asian countries, Africa, and Europe. The initiative covers 
around sixty-five countries in three continents, 24 with a total population of around 4.4 billion, or 
sixty-three percent of the world population. These countries account for 29% of global GDP and 
23.4% of global merchandise and services exports. The project has often been compared with the 
post-WWII Marshall Plan by the United States, adopted as a response to a growing Cold War with 
the Soviet Union,25 but the BRI dwarfs it in size. The Marshall Plan provided only U.S. $13 billion 
to six European countries, which is equal to U.S. $150 billion today.26 In contrast, the estimated 
price tag for the BRI is between one to eight trillion U.S. dollars, which is between six to fifty 
times larger.27 Given the lack of transparency, it is impossible to know the exact figure, but it 
appears large and looming. 
                                                 
20 Joshua Meltzer, “China’s One Belt One Road Initiative: A View from the United States,” Brookings Report, June 
19, 2017. 
21 Francisco Jose Leandro, “The OBOR Global Geopolitical Drive: The Chinese Access Security Strategy,” in The 
Belt and Road Initiative: Law Economics and Politics, eds. Julien Chaisse and Jedrzej Gorski (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 
2018), 90 (citing the teachings of U.S. Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, Leandro writes, “a global maritime trade 
network will naturally develop an immense sea power.”). 
22 Compare Axel Dreher, “IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with 
Conditionality.” World Development 34, no. 5 (May 1, 2006): 769–88; Erica R. Gould, “Money Talks: Supplementary 
Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality.” International Organization 57, no. 3 (ed 2003): 551–86; 
Randall W. Stone, “The Scope of IMF Conditionality.” International Organization 62, no. 4 (October 2008): 589–
620. 
23 Kristen Hopewell, Class of Powers: US-China Rivalry in Global Trade Governance (forthcoming 2020). 
24 China has not officially confirmed the number of BRI countries or the criteria for identifying them, but these 65 
countries (including China) are commonly acknowledged to be BRI countries. Lutz-Christian Wolff, China’s “Belt 
and Road” Initiative – An Introduction, in Legal Dimensions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, eds. Lutz-Christian 
Wolff & Chao Xi (Hong Kong: Wolters Kluwer, 2016), 8. The geographical distribution of the 64 countries other than 
China is as follows: South-East Asia: 11, South Asia: 7, Central and Western Asia: 11, Middle East and Africa: 15, 
Central and Eastern Europe: 20. Lutz-Christian Wolff, “From a ‘Small Phrase with Big Ambitions’ to a Powerful 
Driver of Contract Law Unification? China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the CIS,” Journal of Contract Law 34, no. 
1 (2017): 50–69, 53. In March 2019, Italy signed an MOU on the joint construction of the BRI with China, becoming 
the first G7 country to do so. See Xinhua, China, “Italy Sign BRI MoU to Advance Connectivity,” Mar. 25, 2019.  
25 Benn Steil, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
26 Gwynn Guilford, “Don’t Be Fooled by China’s Grand Plan to Rule the World,” Quartz, Dec. 1, 2017.  
27 Jonathan Hillman, “How Big is China’s Belt and Road?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Apr. 3, 
2018. The projected BRI and the Marshall Plan, however, are more comparable in size in terms of the percentage of 
and China’s the United States’ GDPs at the respective times. 
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China is building the BRI through packages of bilateral arrangements and agreements. 
They involve customs clearance, investment promotion and facilitation, trade and investment 
treaties, dispute resolution mechanisms, visa agreements, memoranda on standardization, special 
economic zones, special tax regimes, academic and student exchanges, and so forth. 28  Each 
economic corridor in the BRI adopts a different package, subject to local negotiations and 
adaptation to different geoeconomic conditions, but the modalities are similar.29 
This building of infrastructure facilitates trade, investment, and migration that have 
complementary effects. Chinese individuals migrate to BRI countries and become entrepreneurs, 
forming a networked Chinese diaspora around the world that further facilitates trade and 
investment with China. To give one example, analysts estimate that about a million Chinese have 
“ventured to Africa over the past two decades to seek their fortunes.”30 As a forerunner of these 
processes, the town of Prato, Italy, the center of the Italian textile industry, became dominated by 
Chinese entrepreneurs and workers making apparel with the “made in Italy” label for global 
markets.31 In 2019, Italy joined the BRI pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding with China 
in the hope that Chinese state-owned entities can help develop Italian ports, further facilitating 
such processes.32 
The BRI is not just about hard infrastructure, but also about electronic commerce, 
facilitating trade of Chinese products. Alibaba Cloud is growing faster than Amazon outside of 
their home markets, and it benefits from its dominance of China’s internal market, which is the 
largest e-commerce market in the world. Hoping to leverage BRI-spurred economic growth and 
ensuing consumer demand into a “One Belt, One Road, One Cloud” future,33 Alibaba has been 
aggressively promoting its Electronic World Trade Platform (eWTP) concept.34 It launched its 
‘Enabling E-commerce’ initiative along with the WTO and the World Economic Forum in late 
2017.35 Through Alibaba, China is once more not only working with, but also layering upon the 
work of, existing international public (WTO) and private (WEF) institutions. 
                                                 
28 Silk Rhodes, “Why China is Lavishing Money on Foreign Students,” Economist, Jan. 26, 2019, 36 (“numbers of 
foreign students grew fourfold in 2004-2016; student numbers from BRI-related countries expanded eightfold,” rising 
to 61%” of those on Chinese government scholarships). 
29 Francisco Jose Leandro, “The OBOR Global Geopolitical Drive: The Chinese Access Security Strategy,” in The 
Belt and Road Initiative: Law Economics and Politics, eds. Julien Chaisse and Jedrzej Gorski (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 
2018), 88. On different economic corridors, see Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century?, 72-85. On university exchanges, 
Ibid., 64-66. 
30 Emily Feng and David Piling, “The Other Side of Chinese Investment in Africa,” Financial Times, Mar. 26, 2019. 
31 Sylvia Smith, The Italian Fashion Capital Being Led by the Chinese, BBC, Feb. 12, 2013. 
32 Stuart Lau, “Italy may be ready to open up four ports to Chinese investment under ‘Belt and Road Initiative’,”  South 
China Morning Post, March 19, 2019; Jason Horowitz, “A Forgotten Italian Port Could Become a Chinese Gateway 
to Europe,” New York Times, March 18, 2019. 
33 Parag Khanna, The Future is Asian: Commerce, Conflict, and Culture in the 21st Century (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2019). 
34 For a detailed discussion of the eWTP, see Henry Gao, “Digital or Trade? The Contrasting Approaches of China 
and US to Digital Trade,” Journal of International Economic Law 21, no. 2 (2018): 308-310.  
35 WTO, “WTO, World Economic Forum and eWTP Launch Joint Public-Private Dialogue to Open Up E-commerce 
for Small Business,” Dec. 13, 2017.  
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In parallel, China is developing free trade zones in the Chinese interior and in BRI countries 
so that Chinese firms may expand their global trade and production networks.36 Within China, the 
country established new pilot free trade zones in 2017 in Chongqing, Henan, Hubei, Shaanxi, and 
Sichuan. They are different from the first batch of Chinese free trade zones, especially the one in 
the Pudong district of Shanghai, which experimented with trade and investment liberalization and 
reducing government red tape. These early free trade zones served as laboratories and “test beds 
for domestic economic reforms” to pioneer market liberalization in order to attract foreign and 
domestic investment, integrate into global value chains, and enhance export-led growth.37 The 
Shanghai free trade zone was the first to apply a “negative list” approach to investment approvals 
so that all investments are automatically permitted, except in sectors explicitly restricted. These 
zones facilitated technology transfer to Chinese industry through emulation, spillovers, and, for 
some, theft, in turn spurring competition and internal Chinese R&D spending. 38  This legal 
experimentation illustrates how transnational legal ordering processes within China helped 
integrate its economy with the global economy 
In contrast, these new free trade zones are strategically selected to develop the poorer 
Western provinces and to link them with BRI countries, which in turn develop free trade zones 
linked to China.39 For example, the ones in Chongqing and Sichuan serve as key nodes in the 
China-Europe Railway Express, which reaches into Europe; while the one in Shaanxi is crucial in 
linking China with central Asian states.40  Within BRI countries, China worked with its state-
owned companies to finance and build huge Chinese-built commercial facilities and industrial 
parks in new “economic and trade cooperation zones.” By January 2019, China announced that it 
had built eighty-two such zones within BRI countries with total investment of 29 billion USD.41 
By building key infrastructure like roads and ports, and helping to revamp customs processes in 
these countries, these projects help achieve key BRI objectives, such as facilities connectivity and 
increased trade.  
These initiatives benefit from legal infrastructure providing certainty and predictability, 
although that infrastructure is much softer and more flexible than Western models. Companies 
                                                 
36 Justin Yifu Lin, “‘One Belt and One Road’ and Free Trade Zones: China’s New Opening-Up Initiatives,” Frontiers 
of Economics in China 10, no. 4 (2015): 585. 
37 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2018), 427. 
38 For example, the largest sector for U.S. investment was information and communications technology companies. 
Ibid., 435. 
39 National Development and Reform Commission, Vision and Actions. These duty-free zones provide for zero percent 
tariffs and eased customs administration, and thus different treatment compared to the rest of the country. They thus 
aim to attract investment to take advantage of lower input costs. 
40 Chongqing and Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province, has more trains than all other Chinese cities with China-
Europe Railway Express. See Zhang Zhi, “China-Europe Railway Express Sped Up: Several Cities Rushed to launch, 
Chongqing, Chengdu, Xi’an are in the Top Three [Zhongou Banlie Jiasupao: Duodi Qiangkai, Chongqing Chengdu 
Xi’an Weilie Qiansanjia],” China Times, Aug. 2 2019, https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2019-08-02/doc-
ihytcerm8069823.shtml 
41 Ministry of Commerce Press Office, 2018 nian Shangwu Gongzuo Nianzhong Zongshu zhi san: Yidai Yilu Jingmao 
Hezuo Chengxiao Xianzhu (2018 Year-end Summary for Commerce Works, No. 3: Significant Achievements in Belt 
Road Initiative Economic and Trade Cooperation), Dec. 27, 2018.  
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typically conduct BRI projects under the umbrella of a Memorandum of Understanding between 
China and the receiving country, complemented by public and private contracts.42 The projects 
focus on infrastructure-building, including roads, rail, ports, airports, pipelines, and 
telecommunications. They catalyze different forms of public-private partnerships between the 
state, state-owned enterprises, and private companies.43 These partnerships are facilitated by the 
intertwined nature of large private enterprises and the Chinese party and state.44 Chinese firms, 
financed by loans from state-owned banks, such as the China Development Bank and the Export-
Import Bank of China, undertake the projects.45 By 2017, China’s Xinhua News Agency noted 
that state-owned enterprises at the central level (as opposed to the provincial level) alone had 
already participated in more than 1,700 BRI projects.46 Chinese state-owned and private firms are 
well-positioned to engage in BRI projects because they are supported by state subsidies — 
including export credits provided below OECD-prescribed minimum rates 47  — and they 
coordinate with state authorities to obtain government procurement contracts. It is estimated that 
around 89% of the contractors of BRI projects funded by Chinese banks have been Chinese 
companies.48 
Critically, China exports Chinese standards through the BRI, challenging U.S. and 
European dominance in standard-setting. Standards are a form of soft law that fall within what 
Jessup called “other law” in his concept of transnational law because they do not clearly fall within 
the categories of private or public international law. Standard-setting is an area of “soft” law that 
legal scholars often ignore because the standards often are not legally binding (formally), though 
                                                 
42 Maria Adele Carrai, “It is Not the End of History: The Financing Institutions of the Belt and Road Initiative and the 
Bretton Woods System,” in The Belt and Road Initiative, eds. Julien Chaisse and Jędrzej Górski (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 
2018). As noted by Wolff, as of June 2016, about 30 of the BRI countries have signed MOUs with China. Wolff, 
Introduction 14-19.  
43 Carrai, It is Not the End of History. The BRI, in part, was a strategic response to the Obama administration’s “pivot 
to Asia” in order to protect its interests in the region. Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century?, 114-119.  
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contemporary China.” Curtis Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, “Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese 
Firm,” Georgetown Law Journal 103 (2015): 665, 671. The large private companies themselves are required to include 
a Communist party committee to ensure good relations with authorities. Mark Wu, “The China Inc. Challenge to 
Global Trade Governance,” Harvard International Law Journal 57 (2016): 282-284.  
45 Most of the financing is provided by Chinese banks. Until mid-2018, official data shows that Chinese banks together 
loaned more than 200 billion dollars to BRI projects. See Zhao Meng, “Zhongguo Yinghangye Leiji xiang “Yidai 
Yilu” Fafang Daikuan Chao 2000 Yi Meiyuan (Chinese Banks Issued Loans totaling over 200 billion USD),” China 
Financial News, Apr. 27, 2018. At the same time, loans from AIIB totaled only 5.3 billion dollars. See Xinhua News 
Agency, “Yatouhang yi Pizhun Touzi ‘Yidaiyilu’ Xiangmu chao 53 Yi Meiyuan (AIIB have Approved 5.3 Billion 
USD loans to BRI Projects),” Xinhua, July 7, 2018. China created a Silk Road Fund in 2014 under the central bank, 
the People’s Bank of China. 
46 Xinhua, “Zhongyang Qiye Jiji Canyu ‘Yidai Yilu’ Jianshe, Shezu chao 1700 ge Xiangmu (Central SOEs Actively 
Participating in BRI Construction, Involved in over 1700 Projects),” Xinhua News Agency, Dec. 23, 2017. The 
numbers should be read with some scepticism given that companies may label BRI projects to signal loyalty to 
President XI given that this is his favoured policy initiative. Tanner Greer, “One Belt, One Road, One Big Mistake,” 
Foreign Policy, Dec. 6, 2018. 
47 Hopewell, Clash of Powers. 
48 “Gateway to the Globe,” Economist, July 28, 2018, 15. 
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they can have major impacts in practice. China has established national standards that it requires 
manufacturers and service providers to use when entering China’s market. In turn, Chinese 
companies use these standards when exporting goods and services abroad.49 Given the size of 
China’s market, China can use domestic standard setting to provide a competitive advantage for 
Chinese companies in its internal market. And given the number of infrastructure projects abroad 
that China finances, China is well-positioned to shape international and regional standards in 
practice, such as for infrastructure. 
When Chinese firms like Huawei build telecommunication and other infrastructure projects 
in BRI countries, they use Chinese standards rather than other international ones. In this way, 
China can gradually shape the adoption of Chinese standards through practice in many regions in 
the world, establishing facts on the ground with increased market share. 50  Through network 
effects, the standards can become dominant over time. Some of these standards contain patented 
technology and intellectual property so that not only will Chinese companies have a first mover 
advantage, but they also can receive royalties, including from other companies that bid for BRI 
contracts.51 
Most worryingly for the United States, China appears to have the lead in developing 5G 
(fifth generation) wireless technology standards, where Huawei seeks dominance. 52  5G 
technology could fundamentally change the economy as well as everyday life, unleashing new 
competition for technological leadership. 53   As an April 2019 report of the U.S. Defense 
Innovation Board warns, “[t]he country that owns 5G will own many innovations of these 
innovations [such as for autonomous vehicles and the Internet of Things] and set the standards for 
the rest of the world.... That country is currently not likely to be the United States.”54 China’s lead 
in this area implicates developments in critical fields such as artificial intelligence, robotics, and 
smart manufacturing — the so-called Internet of Things involving sensors and data collection in 
an increasingly digitalized, data-driven global economy. 55  Chinese companies are becoming 
                                                 
49 Andrew Polk, “China Is Quietly Setting Global Standards,” Bloomberg, May 7, 2018.  
50 China also attempted this strategy in the early 2000s when it announced that companies had to use its Wi-Fi standard 
called WAPI for products sold in China, but at the time it was in a weaker position. It backed down under pressure 
from the United States and Japan, and a network of companies and Chinese exporters critical to global value chains. 
Han-Wei Liu, China standard time: The boundary of techno-nationalism in megaregionals, in Governing Science and 
Technology under the International Economic Order, Shin-yi Peng, Han-Wei Liu and Ching-Fu Lin 114-138 (2018). 
51 Peter Yu, “Building Intellectual Property Infrastructure Along China’s Belt and Road,” University of Pennsylvania 
Asian Law Review 14 (2019): 275-325. 
52 Alan Beattie notes that “Ren Zhengfei, the founder of Huawei, told the FT this month that it was seeking dominance 
in the internet of things sector, using China’s large manufacturing sector to develop chips and software for companies 
to connect factory floors to the internet.” Alan Beattie, “How the US, EU and China Compete to Set Industry 
Standards,” Financial Times, July 23, 2019. 
53 5G wireless technology expands capacity, enhances the speed of information flows, reduces latency for near-real 
time communication, and transforms scalability for new services. Klint Finley, The WIRED Guide to 5G, Wired, Dec. 
18, 2019. 
54 Defense Innovation Board, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DoD (Apr. 2019), 7. 
55 Gregory Shaffer, “Trade Law in a Data-Driven Economy: A Call for Modesty and Resilience” (on file). 
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increasingly competitive in these areas, potentially giving Chinese innovators and vendors a 
critical advantage in multiple product fields.56 
China is investing major resources in developing transnational standards through domestic 
and international bodies as a complement to its BRI initiatives. To give a controversial example, 
China and Chinese companies are working to shape UN facial recognition standards in the 
International Telecommunication Union in ways that concern human rights groups.57 In 2018, 
China launched “China Standards 2035,”  a strategic scheme overseen by a revamped agency — 
the Standards Administration of China — to encourage indigenous innovation under Chinese 
party-state guidance.58 Internationally, China has dramatically increased its leadership positions in 
international standard-setting bodies across councils, technical management boards, technical 
committees, sub-committees, and working groups. It volunteers regularly to host standards 
meetings and provide secretariat services. The last president of the International Standardization 
Organization (ISO) was Chinese as is the president-elect of the International Electrotechnical 
Committee (IEC). China could even create its own standard-setting body for Asia and BRI partner 
countries if it does not get its way in international standard-setting bodies — a strategy paralleling 
its development of new international development banks. 
For transnational dispute settlement, BRI contracts initially provided for arbitration to be 
held in hubs in Asia, such as Hong Kong or Singapore, as well as Shenzhen and Shanghai, but in 
2018 China began to seek consolidation of BRI-related dispute settlement in a new international 
commercial court in China. In June 2018, it established the China International Commercial Court 
under the Supreme People's Court. Formally it is regarded as a division of the Supreme People’s 
Court and, as such, its decisions are final and not subject to appeal. This international commercial 
court has two branches based in Shenzhen and Xi'an.59 It reflects once more a form of mimicking 
while repurposing a Western legal model, that of the Commercial Court in London — which 
Singapore had earlier adopted in 2013 with the Singapore International Commercial Court. 
However, in the case of the new Chinese court, unlike in Singapore, the regulations require that 
judges be “able to use at the same time Chinese and English as their work languages.” Moreover, 
                                                 
56 The U.S.-China Security Review Committee writes, “[Beijing’s] efforts may lock in Chinese preferences for 
standards in IoT and supporting infrastructure sooner rather than later, as nascent IoT and 5G standards exist in a 
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59 China International Commercial Court, “About China International Commercial Court,” Supreme People’s Court 
of the People’s Republic of China, June 28, 2018, http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/193/195/index.html. See also, 
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in practice, unlike in Singapore, China has appointed exclusively Chinese judges to the court,60 
assisted by an advisory Expert Committee with predominately non-Chinese experts. By the end of 
2018, the China International Commercial Court announced that it had accepted a variety of cases 
involving foreign companies and Chinese companies.61  
These developments form part of an ongoing shift toward Asia as a center for transnational 
dispute settlement (whether through arbitration or special international commercial courts),62 with 
China aiming to play a central role. These new Chinese and Asian institutions, together with Asian 
professional networks using them, compete to offer services for transnational dispute resolution 
that, in the process, they will shape over time. There will be pressure on the China International 
Commercial Court to be highly professional like the London and Singapore models if it is to 
succeed. Ultimately, the China International Commercial Court’s use will depend on parties’ 
bargaining power, the court’s reputation for expertise and impartiality, and the relationship of the 
host country with China.  
The BRI’s exact size and scope is unclear given China’s lack of transparency. There are 
risks that come with it given its lack of transparency. China already must manage the risk of 
domestic credit crises resulting from state banks’ extension of low-interest loans to state-owned 
enterprises, the terms and accounting for which are opaque.63 By exporting this domestic state-led, 
private-law development model to countries governed by unstable and corrupt regimes, China 
raises new debt exposure not only for the recipient countries, but for China itself. Backlash against 
Chinese debt obligations has intensified in recipient countries, especially following leadership 
changes (such as in Malaysia and Sri Lanka). Criticism of Chinese “debt-trap diplomacy” is rising, 
even though China has shown flexibility in renegotiating loans, more so than Western hedge funds 
that buy distressed debt.64 Nonetheless, if projects foreclose and credit collapses, President Xi’s 
“China Dream,” externalized as part of the country’s “Go Out” strategy, risks becoming a 
nightmare.65 
 
2. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank 
 
                                                 
60 China International Commercial Court, “Judges,” Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China. Erie, 
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61 China International Commercial Court, “The International Commercial Court of the Supreme Court has Accepted 
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Throughout the 2000s, the United States blocked any increase in China’s shareholding and 
voting rights in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund that would reflect China’s 
growing importance in the global economy. 66 Because of its frustration, and to help finance 
regional infrastructure more broadly, China officially proposed the creation of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013. The fact that it proposed both the AIIB and the 
BRI in 2013 suggest that these initiatives represent a coordinated strategy for China to exercise 
greater influence regionally and globally. China signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 
Beijing to create the AIIB in 2014 and AIIB operations started in 2016. The United States opposed 
the bank’s creation and unsuccessfully lobbied countries not to join it. However, in a diplomatic 
triumph for China and defeat for the United States, the AIIB grew to 100 members by 2019, 
including all major developed countries other than the United States and Japan.67  
While the AIIB started as a Chinese initiative and China is the largest shareholder with 
around a 27% voting share, China has tried to play down its influence as the membership of the 
AIIB expanded to include major Western countries. The Chinese government has made clear that 
the projects funded by the AIIB will not be limited to countries in the BRI. However, most of the 
approved projects have been in BRI countries, as the BRI is already vast and expanding. To 
alleviate governance concerns, China has tried to assure that the AIIB follows “best practices” (i.e. 
those of the Western-controlled multilateral development banks), and the AIIB’s lending practices 
to date confirm this policy. For example, the AIIB largely borrows its safeguards and operating 
procedures from other multilateral development banks, and most of its initial projects have been 
co-financed with them. The AIIB emphasizes that “our core principles are openness, transparency, 
independence and accountability and our mode of operation is ‘Lean, Clean and Green.’”68 China 
wishes to develop a reputation as a responsible leader of a multilateral development bank, and it 
knows that civil society will scrutinize the bank’s operations.  
Nonetheless, the AIIB is controlled by China, has permanent headquarters in Beijing, and 
is run by a Chinese President, Mr. Jin Liqun, who previously served as chairman of China’s first 
joint venture bank and chairman of the Supervisory Board of China’s sovereign wealth fund.69 
Indeed, the AIIB is under greater de facto day-to-day control of China than the World Bank of the 
United States. Unlike the World Bank, the AIIB’s directors are based in their home countries, not 
at bank headquarters, and they are required to meet only every three months. Although all AIIB 
projects through 2018 were approved by the board, the bank’s Accountability Framework 
Regulation permits delegation of project approval to the bank’s President as of January 1, 2019. 
The AIIB’s President and staff in Beijing thus potentially can exercise greater autonomy.70  
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The AIIB represents another form of mimicking while repurposing a Western model — the 
Bretton Woods development finance model. Just as the World Bank has served to advance U.S. 
policy goals, the AIIB should advance China’s. However, the mechanisms will be different. The 
United States used the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to require legal reforms in 
line with American style capitalism—known as the Washington consensus. They did so through 
leverage provided under structural adjustment programs and through IMF surveillance policies 
that include Reports on the Observance on Standards and Codes (known as ROSCs) regarding 
good institutional practices.71 Over time, the Bretton Woods institutions reduced their focus on 
funding basic infrastructure and rather emphasized creating a legal framework that would help 
attract private investment.72  
In contrast, the main reason for the AIIB’s establishment is to finance infrastructure 
projects in the region, thus including countries covered by the BRI. This lending, in turn, helps 
develop new export markets for Chinese products. Beijing can use the AIIB to finance 
infrastructure that can be built by Chinese state-owned enterprises and private companies using 
Chinese standards. Even if companies from third countries win the contracts, the infrastructure 
facilitates the trade of Chinese products, such that the lent money can come full circle. Although 
the AIIB will not require legal reforms and will be governed under the principle of “non-
interference,” it offers further means to integrate economies into China’s economic sphere. It helps 
foster ties with interest groups in regional neighbors, enhance China’s place in global governance, 
and develop China’s reputation as a responsible steward of economic globalization and 
development policy. The AIIB, in complement to the BRI, conveys China’s soft power.73  
China has complemented the AIIB with the creation of the New Development Bank 
(formerly called the BRICS Development Bank), which is headquartered in Shanghai. The New 
Development Bank has a capital of $100 billion and its shares are equally divided between the five 
BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), who have equal voting rights in 
selecting its projects. In addition, China has many other channels to finance overseas infrastructure 
projects, such as through China’s state-owned banks, which have provided the vast bulk of its 
development lending.   
These Chinese-led development banks provide developing countries with new sources of 
finance, ones that are linked with Beijing instead of Washington, and that funding comes without 
political conditions to adopt neoliberal policies. In the process, these banks’ operation creates 
leverage that can enhance China’s role in the Bretton Woods institutions. The U.S. Congress’ 
approval to increase China’s voting rights in the IMF and World Bank came only after the AIIB’s 
formation. The AIIB works with the World Bank and so it currently operates as a complement 
within the existing international economic order — a form of institutional layering in the order’s 
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evolving ecology. The AIIB is quite useful to China in the context of the trade war, for it conveys 
a reputation of China as a responsible global leader. Outside the United States and Japan, the rest 
of the world has embraced this Beijing-based institutional development. 
 
C. Developing a Web of Free Trade and Investment Agreements  
 
1. Free Trade Agreements  
 
To complement these initiatives as part of its development and geoeconomic strategy, 
China is creating a web of trade and investment agreements that grant it preferential access to 
foreign markets. This public international law component once more forms part of the evolving 
ecology of the international trade and investment legal orders. It borrows from Western models 
but is tailored to advance China’s interests. At the 18th Party Congress in 2012, President Hu 
emphasized that the “implementation of the FTA [free trade agreement] strategy shall be further 
accelerated.” In response, the State Council issued several Opinions on Accelerating the 
Implementation of the FTA Strategy in 2015, which laid out a comprehensive blueprint for China’s 
trade agreement strategy in complement to its broader private law-oriented finance-trade-
investment model under the BRI.74 As of January 2019, China had signed free trade agreements 
with twelve countries, including South Korea and Australia in 2015.75 In addition, it had launched 
trade negotiations with seven others,76 as well as a trilateral agreement with South Korea and 
Japan. In 2002, it concluded its first free trade agreement with the ten-member Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and in 2003, it formalized Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangements with Hong Kong, and Macau. 77  It was expanding these agreements through 
negotiating a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that would comprise fifteen Asian 
countries, of which China already had a free trade agreement with all but Japan. Overall, China 
envisages over fifty free trade agreements as part of its implementation of the BRI. 78 These 
agreements bolster China’s status as a hub for global and regional value chains. 
China often negotiates agreements incrementally by starting with an agreement on trade in 
goods and then expanding it to cover services after commitments on goods are substantially 
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implemented.79 It frequently complements these agreements with an investment agreement that 
facilitates further economic integration. For example, the China-ASEAN Agreement on Trade in 
Goods entered into force in 2005, while the Agreement on Trade in Services became effective in 
2008. Then, in 2009, the two parties signed an Agreement on Investment. Similarly, China signed 
its agreement on trade in services with Pakistan four years after the parties signed their agreement 
on trade in goods. Developed countries, however, can press China to enter agreements for goods 
and services simultaneously, which is one reason China’s negotiation with Australia took ten years 
to complete. 
These free trade agreements are narrow in scope compared to those of the United States, 
European Union, and Japan. In line with China’s policy emphasis on non-interference in internal 
regulatory affairs and respect for sovereignty, the agreements do not require new rules for 
regulatory issues, such as labor and environmental protection, or competition policy. China prefers 
to address these issues, if demanded by trading partners, in standalone side agreements or 
Memorandums of Understanding. 80 These agreements’ most important impact on behind-the-
border regulatory issues is not formally legal. It lies rather in their promise to facilitate the adoption 
of Chinese standards through trade, as addressed in Part B above.  
China has used these free trade agreements to establish new rules and precedents regarding 
its treatment as a market economy.81 This treatment is important for antidumping calculations, 
where the United States and European Union use constructed data from other markets to determine 
if Chinese products are being sold at less than fair value, resulting in higher antidumping tariffs 
imposed on Chinese products. China has insisted on the recognition of its market economy status 
as a precondition for virtually every free trade agreement that it has signed. However, even though 
eighty-one countries have formally recognized China as a market economy, the United States, 
European Union, and Japan have refused to grant it this status, based on their interpretations of the 
relevant WTO Agreements and China’s Accession Protocol.82 
The biggest among China’s planned trade agreements is the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), a proposed mega agreement between ASEAN, Australia, China, 
Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea that the parties hope to conclude in 2020 (after India 
dropped out in November 2019). The parties launched negotiations in November 2012 to cover 
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trade in goods and services, investment, and intellectual property protection. When India was a 
member, these countries accounted for almost half of the world’s population, around 32% of global 
GDP in nominal terms, almost 40% of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms, and about 
30% of global merchandise trade. 83 Although India’s withdrawal diminishes the agreement’s 
geographic scope, it could facilitate conclusion of a more ambitious agreement. Even without 
India, the RCEP has the potential to become one of the most important free trade agreements in 
the world. The Obama administration’s pivot to Asia and its driving the negotiation of a 
TransPacific Partnership that excluded China accelerated RCEP negotiations. 
According to the Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the parties aim to “achieve a modern, comprehensive, 
high-quality and mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement among the ASEAN Member 
States and ASEAN’s FTA Partners.”84 Although many Western commentators assume that China 
drives RCEP negotiations, this is not the case. In practice, China has assumed a low profile. 
Formally, the RCEP’s Guiding Principles and Objectives explicitly state that “negotiations for the 
RCEP will recognize ASEAN Centrality in the emerging regional economic architecture,” a point 
on which ASEAN insisted. Given ASEAN’s historical and current problems with China, it is not 
surprising that ASEAN would like to be recognized as taking the lead. However, ASEAN is a 
weak regional institution with no uniform agenda. Thus, the “ASEAN Centrality” principle makes 
it difficult to conduct negotiations, much less conclude them. Moreover, even if China wished to 
drive and dominate the negotiations, it has to contend with Japan (the world’s third largest 
economy), followed by South Korea and Australia, as significant countervailing economic powers. 
Thus, the principle of ASEAN Centrality represents a compromise. 
In addition, there is significant geoeconomic rivalry among RCEP members. The relation 
between South Korea and Japan is charged with longstanding conflict, going back to Japan’s 
annexation of South Korea in the first half of the 20th century. The two have been negotiating a 
free trade agreement for almost fourteen years with no conclusion in sight.85 China has conflicts 
with many RCEP members regarding its claims in the South China Sea.86 If countries find bilateral 
talks challenging, there is little reason to believe that they will conclude a more ambitious regional 
agreement. Adding to the problem is the wide disparity of the parties’ development levels, which 
has impeded agreement on a common approach to negotiations.  
Due to these challenges, expectations regarding an ambitious RCEP remain low. Because 
some of the parties are concerned about liberalizing services and investment, and about imposing 
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new requirements on intellectual property and competition policy, these areas likely will involve 
few major new commitments, although intellectual property protection should be largely resonant 
with emerging international norms.87 Significant coverage of behind-the-border regulatory issues 
regarding labor rights and environmental protection generally appears unlikely. If addressed, 
provisions will likely be couched in soft, best-endeavor language, and might be excluded from 
dispute settlement, consistent with the “ASEAN way.” 88  The agreement could even permit 
discriminatory treatment among its members, since this approach may be the only way the parties 
can address each other’s “various sensitivities and interests.”89  
In sum, as a paradigm, the RCEP will be more sensitive to national sovereignty than U.S. 
agreements. It thus will leave more room for policy space, including through provisions providing 
for special and differential treatment and other flexibility mechanisms. For many development 
economists, such an approach is better because it is more flexible for development policy.90 
Although other analysts stress the need for binding commitments on behind-the-border issues to 
facilitate global supply chains, 91  these supply chains already have flourished among RCEP 
countries. They have done so even though the utilization rate by business of preferential tariff rates 
in Asian free trade agreements has been low.92 
 
2. Network of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 
China complements its trade agreements with an even broader network of bilateral 
investment treaties. In total, China has signed 145 bilateral investment treaties, with 110 in force.93 
That is more than any other country except Germany. Its partners include all major economies in 
the world except the United States. In 2008, the United States and China commenced negotiation 
of an investment treaty, but it has been put on hold because of rising geoeconomic tensions 
between them. Chinese investment agreements incrementally build from Western models, such as 
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through acceptance of investor-state dispute settlement, but it is developing them with “soft law” 
alternatives for dispute resolution in light of its preferences. 
China has significantly changed its approach to bilateral investment treaties over the past 
three decades.94 When China first signed investment agreements, it was an importer of foreign 
direct investment, and was correspondingly wary of making extensive investment commitments 
backed by international dispute settlement. As Figure 7.1 shows, China’s joining the WTO in 2001 
almost immediately had a huge impact on incoming investment into China, as multinational firms 
increasingly used China for their global supply chains. However, it was only around 2005 that 
China’s outbound investment began to take off, soaring particularly in the wake of the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. Correspondingly, China’s investment agreements became more 
protective of outbound investors. 
In the late 1990s, there were signs that China’s view on investment treaties was changing 
in light of the prospects of increased outbound Chinese investment. The 1998 investment treaty 
with Barbados heralded a new Chinese approach that granted foreign investors access to investor-
state arbitration under the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).95 Since around 2008, a new generation of Chinese bilateral investment treaties emerged 
with two new features. First, they included a national treatment obligation pursuant to which the 
state cannot favor domestic enterprises, subject to exceptions for only existing measures.96 Second, 
the new agreements expanded the scope of ICSID investor-state arbitration to cover all investment 
disputes.97   
These changes reflect China’s shift from being the world’s largest destination of foreign 
direct investment — it surpassed the United States in 2003, two years after joining the World Trade 
Organization98 — to becoming one of the world’s major capital exporting nations. In 1999, China 
launched its “Going Global” (or “Go Out”) policy, where it encouraged Chinese firms to invest 
abroad.99 The results were impressive. Whereas China was the world’s top destination for foreign 
direct investment between 1990-2015, by the end of that period, it also had become one of the 
world’s primary foreign investors. In 2001, outward Chinese foreign direct investment constituted 
only 15% of China’s inbound investment. By 2016, Chinese outward foreign direct investment 
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substantially surpassed it, although it plunged in 2018 and 2019 because of rising trade tensions 





Note:  Sources: Incoming FDI: MOFCOM Report on Foreign Investment in China (2017-18), UNCTAD World 
Investment Report (2008, 2002, 2000) and China News; Outgoing FDI: MOFCOM Report on Development of China’s 
Outbound Investment (2018), UNCTAD World Investment Report (2002, 2000) and Xinhua News.101 
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Figure 7.1. China's incoming and outgoing FDI





China’s investment strategy takes two dominant forms. As part of China’s Go Out policy, 
the government encouraged Chinese state-owned and private enterprises to acquire advanced 
technology through acquisitions of companies in the United States, Europe, and other developed 
countries. In parallel, it encouraged such companies to invest in developing countries as part of 
the BRI and outside of it, particularly in infrastructure and resource extraction projects. The first 
type of investment involves corporate acquisitions and the second greenfield foreign direct 
investment. The total value of outbound Chinese investment is greater in developed countries 
given the cost of major acquisitions. For example, China National Chemical Corp bought the 
Swiss-based Syngenta for US$43 billion in 2017 (the largest acquisition to date), which is critical 
for China’s ambitions in agricultural biotechnology.102  
China’s investment in BRI countries has continued to grow, increasing Chinese demands 
for investment protection. In 2018, it amounted to US$15.64 billion, which accounted for 13% of 
China’s total overseas direct investment, as Chinese investment to the United States plummeted.103  
In 2017, Chinese firms signed 7,217 new project contracts in BRI countries, with a total contract 
volume of US$144.3 billion, constituting 54.4% of its total foreign project contracts. 104 Since 
many BRI countries pose high political and economic risks, China and Chinese companies need 
to find ways to protect their investments, including through bilateral investment treaties.105  
By 2018, China was viewed as a  “status quo” country favorable to the existing global 
investment law regime, as opposed to a transformational one proposing new models, as in the case 
of Brazil and (to a lesser extent) India.106 From their international trade law experience, some 
Chinese trade specialists believe that China could look favorably on an appellate process for 
investor-state dispute settlement. As one of our interviewees working with the government 
observed, China has often fared better challenging U.S. import relief measures before the WTO 
Appellate Body than before ad hoc panels, and it takes note that the United States has never lost 
before ad hoc panels in investor-state dispute settlement under NAFTA and other treaties (where 
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there is no appellate mechanism).107 Within the United Nations working group in UNCITRAL 
assessing the reform of the investment law regime, China has stressed that the inconsistency and 
incorrectness of arbitral decisions “were problems in the system and that the existing mechanisms 
of review (annulment and judicial review) were inadequate.”108 On these grounds it supports 
consideration of “a permanent appellate mechanism as a reform proposal.”109 In sum, China found 
that the investment protection models developed in the West suited it for protecting its own 
outbound investments and expressed support for their further judicialization. Nonetheless, China’s 
investment agreements are still generally more respective of state sovereignty than U.S. and 
European ones, and China is likely to rely much more on soft forms of dispute resolution in light 
of its purposes. 
 
D. The Transnational Legal Order for Intellectual Property Rights and China’s Innovation 
Strategies: The Indigenization of a Western Transplant  
 
1. The Transnational Legal Ordering of Intellectual Property: From a Western Transplant 
to Indigenous Innovation 
 
As part of its grand strategy to expand trade and investment along the BRI, China also has 
massively boosted its technological development. China already deemed it risky to rely on Western 
technologies before the United States launched a trade war, and it has been encouraging indigenous 
innovation through government subsidies complemented by enhanced intellectual property 
protection. Yet unlike the United States and European Union, China is not an evangelist pressing 
countries to change their intellectual property laws and practices. Rather, China has gradually and 
pragmatically enhanced its own internal intellectual property system by adopting and repurposing 
Western models with the aim of becoming a world leader in developing new technologies. These 
technologies will be critical for the BRI, including through standards used for infrastructure 
projects, which in turn create corridors for exporting Chinese manufactured products that use 
advanced technologies such as robotics and artificial intelligence. This section first addresses 
China’s long and contentious relationship with the United States over intellectual property and its 
internal development of intellectual property laws and institutions. It then assesses China’s 
strategic plan to develop indigenous technology, reduce dependence on the West, and become a 
world technological power at the cutting edge of the next industrial revolution. 
Intellectual property is a legal construct that raises controversy within and among countries. 
Economists stress its utilitarian function in promoting innovation, while noting that too stringent 
grants of intellectual property rights can facilitate monopoly power that impedes it. The 
appropriate balance between innovation-inducing and innovation-impeding property rights is a 
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function of development and sectoral context. Some economic sectors need monopoly rights for 
larger periods more than others to invest in innovation. Countries with advanced economies 
generally prefer and benefit from greater provision of intellectual property rights than those that 
are less developed. Private interests, in contrast, do not take a utilitarian, social welfare view. They 
rather aim to use “rights” to maximize profits regardless of the positive or negative impact on 
innovation and social welfare. 
In the late 1980s and 1990s, the private sector in the United States and Europe pressed their 
governments to adopt and enforce new, more protective intellectual property laws nationally and 
internationally.110 When China joined the WTO in 2001, it agreed to stringent intellectual property 
commitments across all areas of intellectual property, coupled with commitments to civil and 
criminal enforcement. This change required an immense legislative effort to adopt legal transplants 
from the West.111 Yet, by 2018, after China made innovation a core part of its development 
strategy, the United States became increasingly concerned with Chinese rivalry in a race for 
technological dominance. Some of the U.S. complaint was about theft, and some of it was about 
China’s licensing practices that discriminated against U.S. companies or used the leverage of 
granting access to China’s huge market to obtain “voluntary” transfers of intellectual property 
(such as source code) to Chinese joint venture and contractual partners. The United States also 
complained about China’s requirements for the localization of data, such that the Chinese 
government and companies could more easily access and steal it, as well as to build national 
champions that rival U.S. internet-based companies. But part of the U.S. concern is simply about 
China’s promise of becoming a global leader in cutting-edge technologies, ones where China, in 
turn, will claim intellectual property protection. This transformational story within China forms a 
key part of its international trade and investment strategy that is shaping the ecology of the global 
trade and economic system. 
China’s relationship to intellectual property law is intricately linked to its relationship with 
the United States. In 1979, China entered into a bilateral agreement with the United States 
regarding intellectual property protection in the context of their trade relations, following which 
China joined the World Intellectual Property Organization.112 Shortly after, China enacted new 
patent, copyright, and trademark laws between 1982-1984, and acceded to the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1984. The United States continued its pressure on China 
to recognize U.S. intellectual property, placing the country on its “Priority Watch List” for 
allegedly unfair trade practices, and threatening sanctions. This helped spur China’s adoption of 
its 1990 copyright law.113 China took further steps to avoid sanctions by signing a Memorandum 
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of Understanding Between China and the United States on the Protection of Intellectual Property 
in 1992, which catalyzed further amendments to Chinese laws and regulations.114 Most notably, 
as part of its accession to the WTO in 2001, China agreed to the WTO Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), complemented by further 
commitments in its Working Party Report as part of its accession to the WTO, which included 
fifty-five paragraphs on intellectual property.115 This marked a tectonic shift in China’s intellectual 
property rights regime, and it ushered in new domestic institutional development.116 At this time, 
transnational legal ordering was top down for China, as China was pressed to adopt Western legal 
norms. Although China was in the process of becoming a manufacturer of the world, the 
technology came from abroad and the royalties flowed there. 
Countries are best positioned to resist what they view as impositions by foreign powers at 
the enforcement stage.117 Although the TRIPS Agreement provides for protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights, it also contains ambiguities and exceptions. China took advantage 
of them to defend its interests, while also turning a blind eye to infringements, in part because it 
lacked administrative capacity at the local level, but mainly because it had less interest in 
enforcement given its other priorities.118   
After China joined the WTO, the United States pressured China to comply with its new 
WTO commitments. U.S. private associations, such as the Business Software Alliance working 
with International Data Corporation, found that China had a piracy rate of ninety percent in the 
mid-2000s.119 In 2007, the United States brought a WTO complaint against China for failing to 
comply with its commitments under the TRIPS Agreement and the Accession Protocol. China 
invested significant resources in defending the case, whose outcomes was largely a draw.120  
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The TRIPS Agreement, combined with China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO, 
nonetheless had major implications in China, as it created new opportunities for transnational legal 
ordering that catalyzed stakeholders in China, including the government and private actors, 
triggering top-down and bottom-up processes. Developments in China were not simply foreign 
“transplants.” From a top-down vantage, since 2006, the government has been trying to create its 
own domestic “indigenous innovation” policies, to the consternation of the United States and 
Europe. It invested significant resources in developing new intellectual property institutions to 
support such innovation, including specialized judges and courts for intellectual property disputes. 
From a bottom-up perspective, Chinese individuals invested in new careers, including as attorneys, 
patent and trademark agents, patent examiners, and agency and judicial officials. 121  Chinese 
companies hired and worked with these individuals. In parallel, domestic constituencies that 
embraced intellectual property protection and became rights holders engaged in information 
campaigns and enforcement actions.122 They worked to shape public awareness and attitudes 
towards intellectual property, including among new generations of Chinese. As the Chinese 
became wealthier, consumers became more interested in consumer protection, such as against 
trademark fraud. In other words, WTO law supported the dynamic development of transnational 
legal ordering over the governance of intellectual property that shaped state institutions and 
professions which, in turn, interacted with new constituent demands.123 
Remedies for violations of intellectual property rights were initially weak in China. Over 
time, China enhanced them, including because of pressure from domestic stakeholders. In 2000 
and 2001, China amended its patent, copyright, and trademark laws to provide for injunctive relief 
for the first time, which parties increasingly used.124 Although the United States criticized China’s 
criminal laws for lacking sufficient power to deter violations, 125  China expanded the list of 
criminal intellectual property offences and granted more enforcement powers to criminal courts.126 
At the local level, administrative agencies were to enforce intellectual property rights, but courts 
also played an increasing role through criminal penalties and by allowing  litigants to protect their 
rights against infringements by actors operating outside of local jurisdictions.127   
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These changes required considerable institutional development. Analysts now consider 
China’s State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) to be “in the top tier of patent offices that will 
dominate the emerging system of global patent administration.” 128  The number of patent 
examiners in SIPO soared from around 400 in 1996129 to around 5000 in 2009130 to over 11,400 
in 2017.131  China is now the largest issuer of patents in the world, surpassing the United States.132 
In 2017, it ranked second in terms of international patent applications and third in terms of 
international trademark registrations.133 The bulk of these patents are weak utility and design 
patents (as opposed to invention patents) filed in response to university, career, and other 
incentives, and are soon abandoned to avoid filing fees.134 Yet, although China is still playing 
catch-up, its ambitions are grand. 
At the judicial level, China created specialized intellectual property divisions within courts 
and, in 2014, specialist intellectual property courts in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.135 These 
courts have directly applied the TRIPS Agreement in dozens of private disputes.136 In 2015 alone, 
these specialist courts concluded 9,872 cases.137 In 2018, China created new tribunals for defined 
technology-related intellectual property matters in ten provinces and two additional cities around 
the country, while stripping some Chinese courts of jurisdiction over these matters.138 It also 
established a specialized intellectual property court of appeal at the national level to foster uniform 
jurisprudence in intellectual property law.139 Housed in the Supreme People’s Court and headed 
by one of its Vice-Presidents, the new court has heard all appeals against patent-related decisions 
from lower courts from January 1, 2019.140 In three years, it is expected that appeals on other 
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intellectual property cases, such as copyright and trade secrets, also will be made to the new 
court. 141   Paradoxically, China “has emerged as the world’s most litigious country in the 
intellectual property area,” with 16,010 new patent cases, 37,946 new trademark cases, and 
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In international negotiations, China has been a status quo country on intellectual property 
issues.144 It has not actively contested the international intellectual property regime, unlike Brazil 
and India. Unlike them, it also has not issued (or threatened to issue) a compulsory patent license, 
such as for essential medicines. And it is the only BRICS country to agree to prohibit parallel 
imports of products that businesses can use to evade intellectual property protection. In this sense, 
China has largely mimicked and built upon Western laws and institutions. However, as we will 
see in the next section, China has repurposed them as part of its broader international goals. China 
now seeks to be a technological leader, such as in biotechnology, harnessing its large market and 
huge public and private investment in research and development as part of its indigenous 
innovation policies. It now supports the enhancement of intellectual property protection abroad 
through its Belt and Road Initiative. In doing so, it has worked with the World Intellectual Property 
Organization.145 
 
2. China’s Challenge: Development of Indigenous Innovation Policies 
 
Although China’s intellectual property laws developed from transplants from the West, it 
adapted them into a national asset that is critical for its development model. As in the United States, 
the private sector, seeking economic rents through the monopoly power intellectual property 
provides, helps drive intellectual property protection. Yet government technocrats are in much 
greater control of intellectual property policy in China than in the United States, and their focus is 
on innovation and economic development. Since the mid-1990s, China has actively used industrial 
policy to promote the development of high-tech and other key industries.146 To avoid dependency 
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on Western firms and subjection to leverage from the United States, China launched initiatives to 
encourage indigenous innovation, or what it called “independent intellectual property.”147 The 
government wished to shift the country’s logo from “made in China” to “created in China.” It 
wished to become dominant in cutting-edge technology. The U.S.-launched trade war increased 
its urgency. 
The development of a strong intellectual property rights regime is an important component 
of China’s innovation initiatives. In February 2006, the State Council issued “The National 
Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020),” 
which stressed the need to build “innovative capacity” to become “an economic power.” To 
enhance China’s innovative capacity, the Plan set guiding principles for “indigenous innovation, 
leapfrogging in priority fields, enabling development, and leading the future.” To encourage 
indigenous innovation, the Plan stressed the need to “further perfect the nation’s IPR system and 
create an agreeable legal environment that respects and protects IPR, increase public awareness of 
IPR, uplift the nation’s IPR management level, enhance IPR protection, and crack down on various 
IPR piracy activities according to law.”148 
In line with the Plan, patent filings soared in China (Figure 7.3). In the 1997-2011 period, 
patent filings in China increased by 3,245 percent. In 2016, China’s patent applications continued 
to increase by an annual rate of 18.7 percent. 149  Only the United States exceeded China in 
international patent applications filed through the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 2018, and China 
should soon surpass it.150 Huawei Technologies became the world’s leading filer of international 
patent applications and two other Chinese companies (ZTE Corporation and BOE Technology 
Group) were in the top ten.151 Among educational institutions, four Chinese universities appeared 
in the top ten filers in 2018, each making the list for the first time. Although the bulk of Chinese 
patents remain weak (for the reasons noted earlier), there is a concerted effort to enhance quality 
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and strengthen protection, as reflected in increases in patent litigation (Figure 7.2) and royalty 




Source: WIPO Statistics Database.153 
  
China’s development of intellectual property protection now forms part of its strategy to 
make China a global leader in innovation. Changes in China’s five-year plans over time reflect 
China’s shift in emphasis in its development strategy. Innovation rose from a relatively marginal 
focus in the 10th Five-Year Plan in 2001 when China joined the WTO to a dominant focus in its 
13th Five-Year Plan in 2016.154 In 2015, China launched its “Made in China 2025” policy to 
upgrade Chinese industry, which posed a new threat to Western technological dominance.155  
Building from Germany’s “Industry 4.0” project and U.S. industry’s “Industrial Internet” 
initiatives, the Made in China 2025 plan aims to link big data, automated analytic tools, and 
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wireless sensor networks with industrial equipment for “smart manufacturing.” It listed ten priority 
sectors — advanced information and communications technology; advanced automated machine 
tools and robotics; aerospace and aeronautics; high-tech shipping; rail transport; new energy 
vehicles; power equipment; agricultural machinery; new materials; and advanced medical devices 
and pharmaceuticals. These industries form part of what is envisaged as a fourth industrial 
revolution, which builds from digitalization, cloud computing, and other new technologies that are 
critical for efficiency, quality control, and product responsiveness. China’s ability to collect data 
on its one billion citizens offers it a strategic advantage.  
The plan set targets for China to become “self-sufficient” by raising the domestic content 
of core components and materials from below 20% in 2018 to 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025.156 
It represents a new form of import substitution policies (grounded in local content targets), but 
with the further aim of China obtaining a “world-leading” position by 2049.157 This symbolically 
important date coincides with the one hundredth anniversary of the Chinese communist revolution. 
The policy complements the BRI, which is to be “a high-tech road” using Chinese technology.158  
These policies entail long-term strategic planning, public goal setting, public-private 
coordination and mobilization, and massive state funding at the central and local levels through 
low-interest loans, capital injections, and other subsidies. The government subsidizes these sectors 
through new funding mechanisms such as the Advanced Manufacturing Fund and the National 
Integrated Circuit Fund.159 It uses government procurement and licensing procedures to favor 
Chinese companies and facilitate Chinese “absorption and re-innovation” of foreign technology in 
support of Chinese self-sufficiency and economic dominance in these sectors.160 It encourages 
private and state-owned companies to invest in foreign countries, and it financially supports their 
external acquisitions, so that they gain access to advanced technology, such as for the next 
generation of semiconductors.161 In addition to direct acquisitions, China supports investment 
abroad in industrial parks and joint laboratories for research and development, and seeks to hire 
talent away from foreign companies. 162 In parallel, the government supports and encourages 
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investment in high-tech startups, both in China and abroad, often linked to universities.163 By 
2018, the number of Chinese startups valued at over $1billion, otherwise known as “unicorns,” 
was roughly the same as in the United States, and China could soon surpass it.164 The government 
aims to stimulate policy innovation through experimentation at the central, provincial, and local 
levels, including through pilot projects.165 In sum, the Middle Kingdom wants to avoid the middle-
income trap and move up the value chain of production. 166 To do so, it massively supports 
investment in developing and acquiring advanced technologies. As depicted in Figure 7.4, China 
has significantly closed the gap with the United States in terms of royalty flows. While U.S. 
companies received approximately 26.8 times the royalties of Chinese companies in 1998, the 
difference narrowed to just 1.8 times in 2017. 
 
 
Note:  Source: World Bank Databank.167 
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China’s practices spurred a severe response from the United States, as well as defensive 
reactions in other advanced economies that will shape the future of the economic law order. 
Already the 2006 Plan for indigenous innovation was controversial, with some observers calling 
it a “blueprint for technology theft on a scale the world has never seen before.”168 In March 2018, 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative issued a 182-page Section 301 report that 
accused China and Chinese companies of appropriating U.S. technology and intellectual 
property.169 The Section 301 report recognizes that China’s ambitious “Made in China 2025” 
project aims to make China a global leader in strategic advanced technology industries, some of 
which have military uses and could threaten U.S. supremacy.170 For example, were China to 
control the cobalt industry, which is required for most modern electronics, then “entire industries 
could come under the control of a rival geopolitical power.”171 The United States raised four main 
accusations against China. First, it accused China of using investment authorizations and joint 
ventures to force U.S. companies to transfer their technology to Chinese companies as a condition 
for gaining access to China’s market. Second, and relatedly, it accused China of using its complex, 
multi-tiered administrative licensing regimes to force de facto technology transfer, thereby 
discriminating against U.S. firms in favor of local ones. Third, it challenged state support of 
acquisitions of U.S. technology from U.S. companies as unreasonable and a threat to U.S. 
technological leadership. Fourth, it accused China’s People’s Liberation Army and Chinese 
companies of cyber theft of sensitive commercial information, including by leveraging 
government intelligence for commercial gain. In each case, it highlighted the central role of not 
only the Chinese state but also the Chinese Communist Party which is the ultimate power within 
the state. 
In parallel, Europe and other advanced economies heightened review and restrictions on 
Chinese acquisition of high-tech companies and their technology.172 The United States joined 
forces with the European Union and Japan to form a common front against Chinese practices that 
favored Chinese state-owned and private companies, including regarding technology licensing and 
transfers.173 Under pressure from the United States and others, the Chinese government and media 
stopped referencing the plan under the “Made in China 2025” moniker. But China’s ambitions to 
                                                 
168 James McGregor, China's Drive for 'Indigenous Innovation': A Web of Industrial Policies (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, 2010), 4.  
169 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “USTR Section 301 Report.” 
170 Ibid., at 14. Indeed, the Made in China 2025 plan promotes “the “two-way transfer between military and civilian 
technologies.” Anthea Roberts et al., “Geoeconomics: The Chinese Strategy of Technological Advancement and 
Cybersecurity,” Lawfare, Dec. 3, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/geoeconomics-chinese-strategy-technological-
advancement-and-cybersecurity.  
171 James McBride, “Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Threat to Global Trade,” Council on Foreign Relations, Aug. 2, 2018. 
172  Nikkei, “Chinese M&A Deals Face Wall as US and Europe Guard Tech,” Nikkei, June 19, 2018, 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/Chinese-M-A-deals-face-wall-as-US-and-Europe-guard-tech.  
173  USTR, Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European 
Union, Sept 25, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/september/joint-
statement-trilateral.  
 35 
shift toward a high-tech, high productivity economy through public-private coordination 
continue.174 
Pursuant to the Section 301 investigation, the United States raised tariffs on $50 billion of 
Chinese imports in two tranches in July and August 2018, then another $200 billion in September, 
and threatened to cover all Chinese imports. In parallel, the United States filed a new WTO 
complaint against China’s discriminatory technology licensing requirements, which facilitates the 
transfer of foreign technology to their Chinese joint-venture partners.175 Going further, the United 
States issued an arrest warrant for Huawei Technologies’ chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou, 
the daughter of the company’s founder, who was apprehended in December 2018 while she was 
changing flights in Canada, for dodging U.S. sanctions against Iran and for the theft of 
technology.176 These actions were shots across the bow to counter China’s ambitions, as China’s 
innovation and intellectual property policies trigger geoeconomic conflict with the United States. 
Once more, U.S. threats could induce Chinese reforms to crack down on cyber theft, remove 
discriminatory aspects of its technology licensing regime, and eliminate provisions that the United 
States claims entail “forced technology transfers” to a joint venture partner as part of investment 
approvals — what others call “trading market for technology.” 177 For example, China’s new 
Foreign Investment Law enacted in 2019 contained provisions that prohibit forced technology 
transfer, provide better intellectual property protection for foreign investors, and grant pre-
establishment rights for investors. Yet what matters will not be formal law — which is subject to 
interpretation in implementation and malign neglect — but actual practice.  
China remains far behind the West in technology. To the extent that China 2025 is only a 
top-down project based on quantitative targets and campaigns leading to inefficient spending and 
accrued debt, and does not harness bottom-up forces, it could suffer severe weaknesses, leading to 
subsidy gluts, overcapacity, and increased credit risks to the Chinese economy. Thus, in the end, 
it may not compete successfully with the more bottom-up, dynamic capitalist system of Silicon 
Valley and the West. But in that case, one might ask, why not let the two systems compete?  
The underlying geoeconomic tensions and conflict now appear destined to continue, 
especially given the dual use of many leading technologies. The U.S. ban on the sale of parts and 
software to the Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE in April 2018 on national security grounds, 
which all but shut down the company, and its placement of Huawei and other Chinese companies 
on the Entity List for export controls in May 2019, which effectively can blacklist them, illustrate 
the risks to China of its technological lag. Following the direct intervention of President Trump, 
the ban was lifted after ZTE paid a US$1 billion fine, and the United States has deployed the Entity 
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List as a bargaining chip that can be modified or tailored to permit critical sales. Yet the threats 
make clear China’s need to develop its innovation policy so that its companies no longer depend 
on Western technology.  
 
E. Conclusion: A Changing Transnational Economic Law Order 
When China joined the WTO in 2001, it was a recipient of legal norms largely designed 
by the United States that were incorporated into the world trading system. It became a diligent 
student of that system and gradually and increasingly engaged with it to defend its interests. As 
China grew economically more powerful, it gained confidence in its own economic model, and it 
began to challenge the U.S.-led legal order with new initiatives. Domestically, it aimed to boost 
economic growth through state-led industrial policy, increasingly carried out by reorganized state-
owned enterprises, as well as private companies linked more closely with the party and the state. 
Its ambitions became particularly evident in high-tech sectors where China’s relentless pursuit of 
“indigenous innovation” led it to enhance protection of intellectual property rights for its own ends. 
These government measures, however, discriminated against foreign intellectual property rights 
holders and raised allegations of outright theft, helping trigger a trade war with the United States.  
Although China officially recognizes the importance of the WTO, and occasionally even 
holds itself out as the champion of the multilateral trading system,178 China has been quietly 
expanding its network of strategic partnerships and bilateral agreements behind the scene. 
Incrementally and pragmatically, it is developing a model for trade and economic law governance 
that puts state-led finance and state-subsidized infrastructure development, combined with 
domestic innovation policy, at the center. In the geoeconomic competition of the 21st century, it 
offers a model of economic integration and governance based not on legal templates and 
transplants of its domestic laws to build regional and global rules and institutions (the U.S. and 
European models), 179  but rather one based on pragmatic, incremental development policy 
grounded in infrastructure development, innovation, and webs of memoranda of understanding, 
contracts, and treaties. China is exporting a developmental model through initiatives like the Belt 
and Road Initiative, facilitating some relocation of labor-intensive sectors abroad while Chinese 
industry moves up the value chain of production and develops preferential foreign ties. It is a 
Chinese model that offers an alternative to U.S.-built and U.S.-dominated institutions. It builds 
from, and layers on, existing international economic law and institutions as part of the changing 
ecology of international economic governance involving increasing geoeconomic competition 
between China and the United States. China is not abandoning institutions such as the WTO. 
Rather, it is positioning itself as their defender while, at the same time, creating new options for 
itself and other countries by fashioning a network of infrastructure projects with supporting treaties 
that, in combination, are creating a Sino-centric transnational legal order for trade. China and 
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Chinese professionals now draw from the trade law-related legal capacity that they built to engage 
with the WTO system for these new initiatives. In sum, China has both mastered the rules of the 
game in the WTO while building a new Sino-centric order in parallel. For China, it is not a question 
of either-or, but each-at-once. Nonetheless, as the WTO’s authority declines, China’s development 
of a new Sino-centric economic order assumes greater salience. 
 The Belt and Road Initiative represents an open architecture since any country can join it, 
in contrast to the U.S. and European club model. Under the club model, the United States and 
European Union aim to build new rules through excluding those outside of the club, only to invite 
them subsequently on their terms.180 That was the model of the GATT and then the WTO with its 
“single package” of agreements incorporating intellectual property and trade in services. China 
joined the WTO and its covered agreements without having negotiated them and, in addition, had 
to make China-specific commitments. Similarly, it is the model for the U.S. network of bilateral 
trade and investment agreements built on common U.S. templates, as well as the abandoned 
TransPacific Partnership. Were China to have joined the TPP, it would have had to agree to terms 
already in place and likely once more had to make additional commitments. The European Union 
epitomizes the club model by requiring massive internal legal and institutional changes for 
countries to join it. 
In contrast, under the Chinese model, law plays more of a background ordering role 
involving “soft” mechanisms of coordination through Memoranda of Understanding and informal 
state-to-state negotiation to resolve disputes, as in a “relational contract” arrangement operating in 
the shadow of China’s economic clout.181 Under such an arrangement, the ongoing relationship is 
more important for the parties than the formal legal commitments so that the contract serves as a 
coordinating device that the parties can adjust and work around as new challenges arise in their 
commercial relationship. In this way, China hopes to build ties with political and economic leaders 
and “shift the center of geopolitical gravity away from the U.S. and back to Eurasia.”182 Under the 
Belt and Road Initiative and China’s web of trade and investment treaties, China is largely 
mimicking and repurposing Western models of contract arbitration, investment protection, and 
trade liberalization, while building on Western norms of intellectual property protection through 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks. However, the repurposed model is based not on a neoliberal 
one grounded in legal commitments as much as a state-led, pragmatic governance model.  
 In complement to the Belt and Road Initiative, China has spent massively on innovation 
through a broad range of policies to support the development and acquisition of advanced 
technologies, including through enhanced intellectual property protection that once more builds 
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from Western models for Chinese purposes. It is seeking to make a great leap forward to become 
a “manufacturing superpower” and an “internet superpower” through state-led and state-
coordinated innovation policies. In this way, it can be at the forefront of a fourth industrial 
revolution that combines big data, automation, and new technologies critical for advanced 
manufacturing. 183  In the process, it hopes to avoid the middle-income trap and become a 
“moderately wealthy” high-income country.  
Although China’s free trade and investment agreements started as rather modest, innocuous 
deals, when these agreements are coupled with the development of the Belt and Road Initiative 
through state-backed loans, investments, and construction projects, one senses the rise of a new 
transnational order based on premises different from the traditional U.S.-centric Washington 
consensus. As for development assistance, the Chinese model (when using its own development 
banks) removes the stringent good-governance conditions attached to loans granted by 
international development banks. In the area of trade agreements, although China calls for the 
substantial reduction of trade barriers on goods, commitments on services tend to be rather 
shallow, while environmental protection and labor rights are left out.184 The Chinese agreements 
also tend to avoid new issues, such as disciplines on state-owned enterprises and competition, or 
substantive rules governing the digital sphere (such as banning data localization requirements). As 
to investment, China has abandoned its earlier position of resisting investor-state arbitration and 
begun to grant more substantive rights to investors, such as pre-establishment rights and the use 
of “negative lists” where investments in all sectors are permitted unless listed as restricted in the 
agreement. This policy change contrasts with the growing resistance to investor protection in 
developed countries, and it reflects China’s shifting position from a major recipient to a major 
provider of foreign investment.  
When it comes to values, the Chinese trade law model can be viewed (formally) as “value-
free” and “non-ideological” since it purports to be non-intrusive in domestic economic governance 
— reflecting the Bandung principles of “non-interference,” “sovereignty,” and “self-
determination.” It can thus be contrasted with the labor, human rights, and environmental 
prescriptions included in U.S. and E.U. trade agreements and the conditionalities set forth in loans 
from U.S. and European-dominated Bretton Woods institutions. Informally, however, China will 
use economic arrangements to pursue its interests, which inevitably reflect values, including to 
extract political recognition of its “One-China” policy and silence on the “three T’s” (Taiwan, 
Tibet, and Tiananmen), repression of Muslims in Xianjing, and any other criticism of China’s 
internal policies.185 These agreements also can serve to support authoritarian leaders to China’s 
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liking. More generally, authoritarian governments will be keen to adopt Chinese practices to 
control the internet and ensure public order, such as through data localization requirements, 
cybersecurity laws, and the adoption of Chinese surveillance and censoring technology. In 
exchange, they will permit Chinese companies to collect data on their citizens that the companies 
can use and market to provide a cutting edge in Chinese product development in the data-driven 
economy. This is not to say that the Western model was centered on values as opposed to interests, 
since the United States and Europe always have pursued their interests. Nonetheless, under China’s 
model, there is no promulgation of liberal values such as human rights and democracy, and the 
government plays a more central role in the market.186 
In sum, China has mimicked and repurposed Western models in developing its own model 
for a Chinese economic law order. This model differs from the multilateral liberal legal order that 
the United States and Europe developed in three aspects: (i) the terms of the bargain; (ii) the means 
of dispute resolution; and (iii) the broader terms of engagement. The terms of the bargain in 
Chinese trade and investment agreements generally focus on market access and not deep 
integration to shape domestic regulation. They thus contrast with new U.S. and E.U. trade 
agreements and proposals before the WTO, including as regards the role of the state in economic 
development, such as through state-owned enterprises and subsidies. Rather, the Chinese model 
aims to affect so-called inside-the-border governance indirectly through exporting the use of 
Chinese standards for information and communications technology and other products in a data-
driven economy. Regarding the means for dispute resolution, the model is “soft” and relies less on 
independent courts and more on state-to-state bargaining and mediation as part of ongoing 
economic and political relations. 
Finally, regarding the terms of engagement, the Chinese model is much less intrusive in 
domestic governance than the U.S. and E.U. liberal model, and thus more respectful of 
sovereignty. Most importantly, it does not give rise to robust international institutions that monitor 
internal sovereign choices, such as the role of the state in the economy, labor and environmental 
protections, and the protection of rights generally. In contrast, the Chinese terms of engagement 
are based on a preference for non-intervention in domestic regulatory affairs and thus greater 
tolerance for different value choices. It thus includes acceptance of authoritarian regimes, state 
surveillance, and repression of political dissidents, as well as state autonomy in choosing the role 
of the state in economic governance. It represents a less transparent, less legalistic, and more 
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decentralized model, grounded in bilateral state-to-state relations and thus is more respectful of a 
state’s “internal” affairs. 
The greatest contrast to the Chinese model is the European Union, which was viewed as a 
model for deep integration of economies in the 1990s when the WTO was created. It was a time 
of liberal triumphalism that is now buffeted.187 To join the European Union, a state had to commit 
to political democracy, the rule of law, and guarantees of human rights, including of minorities — 
policies that would make it impossible for authoritarian governments such as China to join. To 
quote the Copenhagen Criteria issued by the European Council in 1993:  
 
“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well 
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union.”188 
 
It is a highly normative, institutionalized order based on rights and the role of technocratic, 
international bodies to monitor and enforce compliance. The liberal international economic order, 
with the WTO at its pinnacle, and as later expanded through U.S. and E.U. free trade agreements, 
is much less demanding, but it still is grounded in independent international institutions, 
requirements of government transparency, a trend toward greater harmonization of rules and rights 
protections, including labor and environmental protections, and limits on the state’s role in the 
economy. This model is in decline, in large part because of its failure to address distributional and 
inequality concerns, with the United States being the leading example.  
The question arises whether countries considered to be U.S. and European allies can belong 
to both economic law orders or must choose between them. These policy choices will engage 
constituencies within countries in their own internal political struggles, which, in turn, will shape 
the future of the transnational legal order for trade. The United States is expending significant 
political, economic, and diplomatic capital to counter the Chinese-led economic order which it, at 
times, appears to view as an existential threat. In 2018, Vice President Pence gave a major speech 
on China, dubbed the equivalent of the Truman Doctrine on containment of the Soviet Union. 
Pence wished to rally allies to isolate and combat China’s authoritarianism, mercantilism, and 
aggression, including its so-called “debt-trap diplomacy” and “Orwellian system premised on 
controlling every aspect of human life.”189 The United States renegotiated NAFTA to include a 
provision permitting it to withdraw from the agreement if a partner pursues an agreement with a 
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“non-market country,” which clearly targets China. The United States would like to extend this 
condition through agreements with others.190  
The United States might be more successful with its immediate neighbors, but even they 
do not view this provision as a significant constraint on expanding trade relations with China where 
tariff rates are already low. Moreover, U.S. allies in Asia, Latin America, and even Europe are 
pursuing free trade and investment agreements with China. Chile — arguably the U.S. top 
economic law ally in Latin America — already has a free trade and investment agreement with 
China. Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg have formally joined the BRI. The United Kingdom 
continues to work with Huawei, despite considerable U.S. pressure. The economies of U.S. allies 
in Asia, such as Australia, Singapore, and South Korea, depend on good relations with China. To 
quote conservative Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Australia aims to “maintain our unique 
relationships with the United States, our most important ally, and China, our comprehensive 
strategic partner, in good order, by rejecting the binary narrative of their strategic competition and 
instead valuing and nurturing the unconflicted benefit of our close association” with both.191 While 
some in the United States will contend that countries working with both orders are “non-aligned,” 
third countries wish to retain a political alliance with the United States while not severing their 
economic ties with China.192 U.S. allies reject being placed in a position of having to choose. 
China’s hub-and-spokes system, combining private and public international law through 
loans, contract, and contract dispute resolution institutions, coupled with trade, and investment 
agreements, offers the potential of creating an expansive, regional, informal, Sino-centric 
economic order. For this reason, it is illusory to think that the U.S.-China trade war will “be easy 
to win.” Although commentators suggest that the trade war could split the world into competing 
trade blocs and a new geoeconomic variant of the Cold War, most countries will work to navigate 
the geoeconomic tensions between the United States and China so that they maintain strong 
economic ties with both. Thus, if a new Cold War arises, it will be quite different than that with 
the autarchic former Soviet Union.  
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